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INTRODUCTION
T
he Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer has been efficient and effective in reducing
damage to the ozone layer. It also has contributed signifi-
cantly to climate mitigation. This paper recommends further
adjustments to the treaty to help finish the job of protecting the
ozone layer, and to provide further though temporary insurance
against the threat of abrupt climate change.1
The Montreal Protocol is widely considered one of the
world’s most successful multilateral environmental agreements,
having phased out 95 percent of ozone-depleting substances
(“ODSs”) in developed countries and 50 to 75 percent of ODSs
in developing countries — placing the ozone layer on a path to
recover later this century.2 The Montreal Protocol’s success is
based on its strict, flexible, and dynamic design, which has
driven continuous technology innovations; its evolution through
amendments, adjustments, and decisions to reflect the most up-
to-date scientific and technological developments; the commit-
ment by developed countries to provide financial assistance to
developing countries to ensure its successful implementation;
and its attention to compliance from the outset.3
Because many ODSs are also potent greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”) that contribute to climate change,4 their phase-out
under the Montreal Protocol has provided an often overlooked
bonus for climate mitigation: by the end of the decade, the Mon-
treal Protocol will have done more to mitigate climate change
than the initial Kyoto Protocol reduction target, reducing emis-
sions in terms of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)-equivalent by five to
six times that of the climate treaty, the equivalent of eleven giga-
tons of carbon dioxide - equivalent per year (“GtCO2-eq. yr-1”).5
In effect, the Montreal Protocol has delayed climate impacts —
including abrupt and irreversible impacts — by about ten years,
and, with the additional measures discussed below, can delay it
still further.6
Partly as a result of the Montreal Protocol’s success, there is
a public misconception that the problem of ozone depletion has
been “solved.” Some in the international community, referring to
the Montreal Protocol, have gone so far as to ask whether the
Montreal Protocol should be dismantled or merged into the still
unproven climate treaty regime.
But the Montreal Protocol’s work to protect the ozone layer
is far from done. In 2006 scientists recorded the near largest
Ozone Hole ever recorded over Antarctica, and new data indi-
cates that the recovery of the ozone layer above the Antarctic
will be delayed by fifteen years, with a return to pre-1980 levels
not occurring until 2065.7 Ozone layer recovery at mid-latitudes
also is delayed and will not return to pre-1980 levels until 2049.8
The new data does not take into account illegal trade in banned
ODS, nor other challenges of compliance,9 especially in devel-
oping countries where the 2010 ban on chlorofluorocarbons
(“CFCs”) is quickly approaching.10 Without full compliance, the
recovery will be delayed further.
The continuing impact of ODSs on the ozone layer, and the
significant contribution ODSs and some of their substitutes are
making to climate change, demonstrate that the Parties’ commit-
ment to protect the ozone layer has not yet been fulfilled, and
that significant challenges remain.11 These challenges to the
future success of the Montreal Protocol — the most efficient and
effective treaty to date in reducing GHG emissions and mitigat-
ing climate change, in addition to protecting the ozone layer —
come at a time when the impacts of climate change are becom-
ing increasingly apparent.12
National Aeronautics and Space Administration scientist
James Hansen warns that we may have as few as ten years left
before positive feedbacks in the climate system could accelerate
global warming and push the climate system across the tipping
point for non-linear change that would create “a different
planet,” with an ice-free Arctic and coastlines obliterated by ris-
ing sea levels.13 Abrupt non-linear changes to the climate, also
known as Rapid Climate Change Events, include the melting of
the Greenland ice sheet. A complete melting of the Greenland
ice sheet would raise sea levels by an estimated seven meters.14
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But sea levels do not need to rise by seven meters to cause
global catastrophe: a 1.5 meter rise would threaten 36,000
square miles of land along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts
with flooding,15 as well as causing devastation to vulnerable
low-lying island and coastal States. The fallout from this or other
abrupt climate change events could destabilize the world’s social
and governance institutions, which at the very least would
undermine efforts to reduce GHG emissions and at worst could
provoke global military conflicts.16 In any scenario, untold mil-
lions would suffer.
The GHG reductions achievable under the Montreal Proto-
col offer critical low-cost insurance against abrupt changes to
the climate, effectively buying the world more time to get the
Kyoto Protocol’s global carbon market running effectively and
efficiently, and to agree on the post-Kyoto regime. 
The Parties have the opportunity to take immediate action at
the 20th anniversary of the Montreal Protocol in September
2007 to strengthen the ozone regime’s ability to protect the
ozone layer, as well as to maximize its ability to mitigate climate
impacts — in an amount that may exceed the Kyoto Protocol’s
reductions. This may be accomplished by adjusting the Montreal
Protocol to account for the cli-
mate impacts of ODSs and their
substitutes, with due regard for
the special situation of develop-
ing countries and without losing
sight of the other challenges cur-
rently facing the ozone treaty.
This is most effectively accom-
plished by (1) explicitly focusing
on climate benefits in addition to
ozone benefits, using Life-Cycle
Analysis and Life-Cycle Climate
Performance to assess the cumu-
lative environmental impacts of
ODS substitutes and other strategies under the Montreal Proto-
col; (2) minimizing the impacts by favoring the least harmful
ODS substitutes, and promoting further technological innova-
tions, including redesign of equipment, processes, substitutes,
and products, as well as not-in-kind alternatives; and (3) provid-
ing incentives for the destruction of CFCs currently contained in
products and equipment, or otherwise regulating end-of-life
recovery and destruction.
These adjustments to the Montreal Protocol are consistent
with its evolutionary process, as the treaty has repeatedly been
adjusted over its nearly twenty year history to reflect current
developments in scientific understanding and technological
capabilities. Such adjustments also are consistent with more
general principles and concepts of international environmental
law, which create a general obligation to assess and minimize
environmental impacts.
NEW OZONE & CLIMATE CHALLENGES
The ozone layer’s return to pre-1980 levels at mid-latitudes
can be facilitated through two actions. One is to curb higher than
anticipated emissions of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”)
by 2015. The other is to limit the adverse impacts from emis-
sions of CFCs currently contained in products and equipment
(known as “banks”) that will be emitted to the atmosphere once
those products and equipment reach the end of their useful life.
These actions also will delay the impacts of climate change.
They should be undertaken as part of a broader effort to ensure
that the Montreal Protocol systematically considers and takes
into account the climate impacts of ODSs and their substitutes,
and minimizes the impact of its strategies on climate. 
To protect the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol mandates
the focused phase-out of CFCs and other ODSs, which are used
in refrigerators, air conditioning units, and a variety of foams,
solvents, and other applications such as aerosol propellants,
fumigants, and fire-fighting agents. To facilitate the phase-out,
the Montreal Protocol, through its Multilateral Fund, provides
financial assistance to developing countries to replace CFCs
with chemicals less harmful to the ozone layer, such as
HCFCs.17 HCFCs have lower ozone-depletion potentials
(“ODPs”) and generally have lower global warming potentials
(“GWPs”) than CFCs. They were envisioned as short-term sub-
stitutes, scheduled for phase out by 2030 in developed countries
(with 0.5 percent allowed for
servicing after 2020) and 2040
in developing countries (with
consumption frozen in 2016 at
2015 levels).
While HCFCs were critical
in replacing the more damaging
CFCs, their continued use cre-
ates problems for the ozone
layer and the climate. This is
both a problem of under-regula-
tion, where the production of
chlorodifluoromethane
(“HCFC-22”) is rapidly expand-
ing despite the availability of superior substitutes and alterna-
tives, and where banks are not yet regulated at all; and
over-regulation, where the use of dichlorotrifluoroethane
(“HCFC-123”) is being phased-out despite its negligible impact
on the ozone layer and the higher energy efficiency and lower
GHG emissions achieved by its use in large-building air-condi-
tioning units, know as chillers.
UNDER-REGULATION OF INFERIOR SUBSTITUTE: 
HCFC-22 AND ITS HFC-23 BY-PRODUCT
In addition to delaying the recovery of the ozone layer at
mid-latitudes,18 the production of HCFC-22 results in emissions
of trifluoromethane (“HFC-23”), an unwanted by-product that is
a “super greenhouse gas” 11,70019 times more powerful at
warming the planet than CO2.20 The combined climate emis-
sions of HCFC-22, with a GWP of 1,780, and its HFC-23 by-
product, with GWP of 11,700, are projected to reach 1
GtCO2-eq. by 2015 — roughly equal to the emissions reductions
presently required under the Kyoto Protocol.21
The production and consumption of HCFCs is projected to
expand to levels significantly higher than the 163,000 tonnes by
The Montreal Protocol is
widely considered one 
of the world’s most 
successful multilateral
environmental agreements.
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2015 originally predicted by the Technology & Economic
Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) in 1998. One specific country
alone has an installed annual production capacity of more than
300,000 tons, and over the next decade HCFC production could
increase to as much as 800,000 tons (in addition to feedstock use
which is not currently controlled under the Montreal Protocol).
Approximately 75 percent of all HCFC production will be from
HCFC-22, a transitional chemical used in small air conditioning
units and refrigerators. The projected increase in HCFC produc-
tion is being driven by the transfer of the old technology from
developed to developing countries, as well as by rapid economic
growth in the developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (“CDM”), as applied to HFC-23, also
is partly to blame.
Under Kyoto’s CDM, the capture and destruction of HFC-23
emissions at facilities producing HCFC-22 can generate Certified
Emissions Reductions (“CERs”). Given the relatively low cost
of HFC-23 destruction compared to the value of CERs on the
global carbon market,22 the CDM is inadvertently creating a
“perverse incentive” that has created windfall profits for HCFC-22
producers — effectively acting as a subsidy that is driving the
expanded production of HCFC-22.23 HFC-23 destruction projects
have dominated the CDM market, accounting for 52 percent of
all project-based carbon volumes transacted in 2006 and 64 per-
cent in 2005.24 The abundance of CERs from HFC-23 destruc-
tion projects appears to be depressing the price of carbon, which
in turn harms the competitiveness of other CDM projects.25
This problem will not be going away anytime soon. Under
the Montreal Protocol, production of HCFC-22 can expand in
developing countries until 2016, when the baseline is set at 2015
levels, and then remain in production for another 34 years, with
the profits from HFC-23 destruction projects discouraging the
transition to superior ODS substitutes that are ozone- and cli-
mate-safe. Without the subsidy from HFC-23 destruction proj-
ects, it is likely that the projections for HCFC-22 production
would be lower. The initial trend of HCFC production and con-
sumption would be higher in such scenario, but later would be
similar to developed countries, many of which have already
accelerated the phase-out of HCFCs and begun the transition to
superior substitutes.26 The European Union (“EU”) has already
phased-out HCFCs altogether27 and other countries such as
Japan and the United States are expected to adopt phase-out
dates for HCFCs ahead of the 2030 deadline imposed by the
Montreal Protocol for developed countries. 
Past transitions from CFCs to HCFCs and hydrofluorocar-
bons (“HFCs”) helped drive technological innovation in substi-
tutes, manufacturing processes, and equipment, which in many
cases resulted in gains in energy efficiency, reduced leakage, or
other technological improvements. To date about eighty percent
of ODSs that would be in use without the Montreal Protocol
have been replaced by non-fluorocarbon chemicals, which do
not deplete the ozone layer. These substitutes include not-in-kind
chemical substitutes and product alternatives (e.g. a roll-on
deodorant instead of a spray can), changes to manufacturing
processes, conservation measures, and doing without. The tran-
sition out of HCFCs is likely to produce similar innovations and
environmental advances. But developing countries, if they con-
tinue their over-reliance on HCFC-22, will be slow to benefit
from these positive changes. 
OVER-REGULATION OF HCFC-123
The Montreal Protocol does not systematically consider the
climate impacts from the levels of energy efficiency achieved in
equipment that uses ODSs. Equipment that achieves a high rate
of energy efficiency is better for the climate, as its lower energy
use results in fewer GHG emissions from power generation
(assuming the power does not come from renewable sources or
sources that do not result in GHG emissions but raise other envi-
ronmental concerns, such as nuclear reactors). It also results in
lower operating costs over the life of the equipment.
Large-building air-conditioning units, or chillers, provide a
case in point.28 The level of their energy efficiency depends in
part on the type of refrigerant used, with HCFC-123 allowing for
greater efficiency than others. HCFC-123 has a low ODP of
0.02, a low GWP of 76, a short atmospheric lifetime of 1.3
years,29 and offers significant climate benefits due to its signifi-
cant advantage in energy efficiency over the primary alternative,
tetrafluoroethane (“HFC-134a”).30 In addition, it operates at a
low pressure in chillers designed to minimize leaks and is there-
fore considered to have a negligible impact on ozone deple-
tion.31 At present, HCFC-123 offers superior performance for
low pressure chillers (although more energy efficient alterna-
tives may be developed in the future).32
UNEP’s Refrigeration, Air-Conditioning and Heat Pumps
Technical Options Committee concluded in their 2002 Assess-
ment that “[b]ased on integrated assessments, considering the
trade-offs between negligible impacts on stratospheric ozone
and important benefits in addressing global warming, these stud-
ies recommend consideration of a phase out exemption for
HCFC-123.”33
But because HCFC-123 is an HCFC, it is scheduled for
phase-out with the rest of the HCFCs. Chillers are very expen-
sive (U.S. $200,000 to $600,000), and have 30-year life-cycles.
As a result, the phase-out of HCFC-123 could force building
owners looking to buy a chiller within the next several years to
use alternatives that are less energy efficient, more costly to
operate, and more damaging to the climate.34
FAILURE TO REGULATE ODS BANKS
The Montreal Protocol does not place any controls on emis-
sions from “banks” and provides minimal incentives for their
recovery and destruction.35 Banks are defined as the chemicals
contained in equipment and products or stored in tanks.36 Large
amounts of CFCs and other ODS substitutes such as HCFCs and
HFCs (not an ODS but a GHG) currently exist in refrigerators, air
conditioners, insulating foams, and chemical stockpiles, where
they can leak. When equipment reaches the end of its useful life,
the chemicals inside are usually released into the atmosphere. 
With limited incentives for recovery and destruction of
ODS banks, most of the CFCs in banks will be emitted into the
atmosphere over the next decade, with detrimental impacts for
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both the ozone layer and the climate. In addition to contributing
to the expected delay in ozone recovery, emissions from CFC
banks by 2015 could equal approximately 7.4 GtCO2-eq. yr-1 37
— more than seven times the size of the emissions reductions
initially targeted by the Kyoto Protocol.38
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES
The full phase-out of CFCs in 2010 in developing countries
may present the most difficult compliance challenge yet for the
Montreal Protocol.39 Illegal trade in CFCs and other ODSs is
expected to increase once the complete ban on CFCs takes
effect, which will exacerbate the black market operating in both
developed and developing countries.40 Illegal trade currently is
estimated to represent about ten to twenty percent of all trade in
ODSs, which in CFCs alone comprises 7,000 to 14,000 tons per
year, with a value of U.S. $25-60 million.41 The Montreal Proto-
col instituted a licensing system for the transboundary ship-
ments of ODSs to combat illegal trade, but compliance remains
a critical issue.42
Other compliance challenges arise from the lack of control
measures for use of ODSs, such as HCFC-22 and methyl bro-
mide, in feedstock, process agent, and Quarantine and Preship-
ment (“QPS”) applications. This makes it possible for ODSs
produced for these applications to be used illegally in other
applications that have been phased out. Feedstock and process
agent applications are not subject to control measures because,
in theory, the ODSs used in these applications are either con-
verted to chemicals that do not harm the ozone layer or are
destroyed in the conversion process.43 But this does not take into
account any by-products, such as HFC-23 or CTCs, nor the pos-
sibility some will be diverted to illegal trade.
LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
ASSESSING CLIMATE IMPACTS OF ODS SUBSTITUTES
The Montreal Protocol and its Parties have previously rec-
ognized the need to consider the full environmental impacts of
their strategies, especially the climate impacts of ODS substi-
tutes, which often are the most significant impacts. Article 2F(7)
of the Montreal Protocol sets forth the control measures for
HCFCs and states that in addition to minimizing ozone deple-
tion, the decision to use HCFCs should meet other environmen-
tal standards, i.e.: “Controlled substances in Group I of Annex C
(e.g., HCFCs) are selected for use in a manner that minimizes
ozone depletion, in addition to meeting other environmental,
safety and economic considerations.”
This approach was supported by Decision V/8 (Fifth Meet-
ing of the Parties, Bangkok 1993) which requested the Parties to
consider ODS substitutes in light of Article 2F and their “envi-
ronmental aspects.” This was expanded in Decision VI/13 (Sixth
Meeting of the Parties, Nairobi 1994), stating that the TEAP
“should consider how available alternatives compare with
hydrochlorofluorocarbons with respect to such factors as energy
efficiency, total global warming impact, potential flammability,
and toxicity . . .”
Subsequently, a group of 41 Parties also issued a Declara-
tion at the Tenth Meeting of the Parties (Cairo 1998) reiterating
their support for the consideration of climate impacts, noting the
“scientific indications that global warming could delay the
recovery of the ozone layer” and that “environmentally sound
alternative substances and technologies are commercially avail-
able for virtually all HCFC applications.” The Declaration urged
“all Parties to the Montreal Protocol to consider all ODS
replacement technologies, taking into account their global-
warming potential, so that the use of alternatives with a high
contribution to global warming should be discouraged where
other, more environmentally friendly, safe and technically and
economically feasible alternatives or technologies are avail-
able.”44
The consideration of environmental impacts is part of a gen-
eral obligation under principles and concepts of international
environmental law. Specifically, the Environmental Impact
Assessment (“EIA”) principle places a general duty on States to
consider the cumulative environmental impacts of proposed
actions where there are possible transboundary or global
impacts.45 The EIA principle is related to the concept of Inte-
grated Pollution Prevention and Control (“IPPC”), which was
developed to respond to the fact that environmental regulations
targeting a single problem can simply shift pollution from one
medium to another rather than eliminate it. Broadly, it requires a
holistic assessment of environmental impacts when developing
regulations, particularly for the use of chemicals, and has been
incorporated into numerous multilateral environmental agree-
ments and other international instruments, including the Euro-
pean Commission’s 1996 IPPC Directive.
IPPC requires a “life cycle analysis” of environmental
impacts to measure the “cradle-to-grave” impacts of a product,
chemical, or technology. This kind of Life Cycle Analysis
(“LCA”) was codified by the International Standards Organiza-
tion 14040 Series. It was described in the IPCC/TEAP Special
Report as involving an “inventory of relevant inputs and outputs
of the system itself and of the systems that are involved in those
inputs and outputs (Life Cycle Inventory Analysis). The poten-
tial environmental impacts of these inputs and outputs are then
evaluated . . .”46
The concept of Life Cycle Climate Performance (“LCCP”)
is considered a submethod of LCA.47 LCCP was proposed by the
TEAP to calculate the “cradle-to-grave” climate impacts of the
use of ODSs in equipment, measuring the “direct” GWP of
ODSs as well as the “indirect” GWP from GHG emissions from
power generation used in operating the equipment, placing a pre-
mium on energy efficiency. The TEAP explained LCCP: 
The concept of Life-Cycle Climate Performance
(LCCP) is intended to provide a rational way of assess-
ing only those environmental aspects affecting climate
(i.e. only a sub-segment of item (a)) [of Decision V/8
requesting each Party “ . . . to give consideration in
selecting alternative substitutes . . . to: Environmental
aspects . . .”]. . . The total impact on climate of any
technology results from a combination of the “direct”
emissions of greenhouse gases from the system
throughout its life cycle and the “indirect” emissions of
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greenhouse gases associated with the energy used or
saved by the system. . . When the use of a specific tech-
nology creates an incremental energy saving, the reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions from the energy use can far
outweigh the direct emissions over the expected life of
the product.48
LCCP provides a more complete assessment than an earlier
concept known as Total Equivalent Warming Impact49 because it
includes fugitive emissions from the manufacture of the ODSs
and emissions from operating, servicing, and the disposal of the
ODSs at the end of the equipment’s useful life.50
MINIMIZING THE CLIMATE IMPACTS OF
ODS SUBSTITUTES
Based on such a holistic environmental assessment, the
Montreal Protocol then must minimize the climate impacts of
ODS substitutes and alternatives, an approach that is consistent
with the Montreal Protocol’s ultimate objective of eliminating
the use of ODSs through policies based on “developments in sci-
entific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic
considerations. . .”51
Developments in scientific knowledge include the link
between ozone depletion and climate change. The link is based
on complex atmospheric interactions between ozone and climate
and the fact that many ODSs are also GHGs, as described by
TEAP,52 and the joint IPCC/TEAP Special Report.53 This is
acknowledged in the Montreal Protocol, which states that the
Parties are “[c]onscious of the potential climatic effects of emis-
sions of these substances (i.e. ODSs).” 
The IPCC/TEAP stated that “[o]ptions chosen to protect the
ozone layer could influence climate change. Climate change may
also indirectly influence the ozone layer.”54 The Scientific Assess-
ment Panel elaborated further, noting that climate change is
likely to obscure or even harm the recovery of the ozone layer.55
The replacement of ODSs with substitutes and other alter-
natives, including not-in-kind alternatives, will produce climate
benefits to the extent the changes result in higher energy effi-
ciency or otherwise reduce climate emissions. A more explicit
and focused set of strategies is needed within the Montreal Pro-
tocol to minimize climate impacts. 
This is supported by Agenda 21, which calls on Parties to
“[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances, consis-
tent with the Montreal Protocol, recognizing that a replacement’s
suitability should be evaluated holistically and not simply based
on its contribution to solving one atmospheric or environmental
problem.”56 This is further supported by the exclusion of gases
regulated by the Montreal Protocol from the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The
exclusion was made with knowledge that many of these gases
have extremely high GWPs and that their emissions can substan-
tially contribute to climate change, thereby placing additional
responsibility on the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to mini-
mize the climate impacts of ODS substitutes.
As with the assessment requirement, the minimization
requirement is based on principles and concepts of international
environmental law that place a general obligation on States to:
(1) ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) prevent dam-
age to the environment by reducing, limiting, or controlling
activities that might cause such damage; and (3) cooperate in
addressing environmental problems.57
This obligation, which has been codified in a broad form by
the European Commission’s Integrated Pollution Prevention and
Control Directive, places an affirmative duty on States to take
preventative measures against pollution.58 More specifically, this
obligation is embodied in the Substitution Principle, which is
generally defined as “the replacement or reduction of hazardous
substances in products and processes by less hazardous or non-
hazardous substances, or by achieving an equivalent functional-
ity via technological or organisational measures.”59
The Substitution Principle has been codified domestically in
numerous regulations governing the use of hazardous chemi-
cals.60 Recently, it was included in the European Union’s new
chemical policy entitled the Regulation, Evaluation, Authorisa-
tion and Restriction of Chemicals, which requires manufactures,
importers, and users of chemical substances to “analyse the
availability of alternatives and consider the risks and the techni-
cal and economic feasibility of substitution.”61
UNEP, in conjunction with the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry,
and the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, has devel-
oped its own version of the Substitution Principle, known as
Responsible Use, which recommends the use of technologies so
long as the undesirable effects are minimized and the technology
achieves higher environmental performance than its alterna-
tives.62 Responsible Use Principles would permit the use of ODS
substitutes “only in applications where they provide safety,
energy efficiency, environmental, or economic advantage”63 and
where “undesirable effects are minimized and the technology
achieves higher environmental performance than its alterna-
tives.”64
RECOMMENDATIONS
An assessment of the environmental impacts of ODS substi-
tutes, under the cumulative LCA methodology and the climate-
specific LCCP methodology, would include direct impacts from
a substance’s ODP and GWP. Moreover, indirect impacts such as
by-product emissions, leakage, charge size, recovery/destruction
options, and energy efficiency also would be incorporated.
Such an assessment, together with the duty to minimize
environmental impacts, dictates three immediate and attainable
adjustments: 
• accelerating the phase out of HCFC-22; 
• allowing the continued use of HCFC-123 until superior
alternatives emerge; and 
• creating greater incentives for, or otherwise regulating, the
recovery and destruction of ODS banks. 
The problem of compliance also warrants further attention.
In addition to strengthening protection of the ozone layer,
these adjustments have the potential to reduce GHG emissions
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by up to 1–2 GtCO2-eq. by 2015 — which is greater than the
required reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.
ACCELERATED PHASE OUT OF HCFC-22 
AND ITS HFC-23 BY-PRODUCT
The accelerated phase-out of HCFC-22 in the developed
and developing countries will avoid the projected increase of
HCFC-22 production and emissions of its “super greenhouse
gas” HFC-23 by-product.65 It would also reduce the perverse
transfer of the old technology to manufacture HCFC-22 and its
raw material to developing countries.66
The availability of substitutes for ODSs was affirmed by
Regulation (EC) No. 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 29 June 2000 on substances that deplete the
ozone layer, which adopts stricter control measures for ODSs,
including the accelerated phase-out of HCFCs, due to the “ear-
lier than anticipated availability of technologies for replacing
ozone-depleting substances.” The IPCC/TEAP Special Report
also clarified the availability of substitutes for many HCFC
applications, including HFC-134a, HFC blends, CO2, hydrocar-
bons, and ammonia.67 Many of these substitutes provide better
energy efficiency and can be assessed based on LCA/LCCP
before selection. 
Under an LCA/LCCP analysis, determining which substi-
tute offers superior environmental performance depends as
much on the indirect impacts such as leakage, charge size,
potential for recovery/destruction at equipment end-of-life, and
energy efficiency, as it does the more direct measures of ODP
and GWP. For example, HFC-134a and HFC blends would qual-
ify as superior alternatives in minimizing climate impacts only if
they were used in equipment that achieves greater energy effi-
ciency than HCFC-22 and the other substitutes. Reduced leak
rate and greater recovery/destruction also would enhance its
standing. Use of CO2, hydrocarbons, and ammonia would qual-
ify as superior alternatives in minimizing climate impacts only if
their lower energy efficiency levels were improved or offset by
their low GWPs.
The accelerated phase-out of HCFCs raises several issues
that must be resolved by the Parties as they proceed, including
the need to ensure that developed countries will continue to ful-
fill their commitment to provide additional financial assistance
to developing countries through the Multilateral Fund to ensure
compliance with phase-out schedules.68 While some growth in
HCFC consumption may be unavoidable and economically nec-
essary for some developing countries, an aggressive phase-out
schedule is nevertheless technologically and economically feasi-
ble. It should start by moving the base year forward, i.e., to 2006,
perhaps with some controlled growth allowed until 2010, and
then a series of step-downs to ensure continuing progress and
avoid the compliance problems that would otherwise arise (i.e.,
35 percent reduction by 2015, 65 percent reduction by 2020, and
99.5 percent reduction by 2030, with 0.5 percent allowed for
servicing until 2040). This approach, coupled with financial
assistance for the transition to superior substances and technolo-
gies, would ensure immediate and continuous progress, and
avoid the extremely high levels of growth otherwise projected. It
also would make it possible for the global carbon market to fac-
tor in whatever CERs, if any, the CDM allows for the destruction
of HFC-23 from new production beyond that allowed by the cur-
rent methodology.69 Regulators in the EU as well as the archi-
tects of the post-Kyoto regime would be able to calculate the
maximum HFC-23 emissions, and the likely CDM credits possi-
ble, and set the overall emissions cap accordingly.
CONTINUED USE OF HCFC-123 UNTIL SUPERIOR
ALTERNATIVES EMERGE
This same analysis applies to the need to exempt HCFC-123
from phase-out and allow its continued use until superior substi-
tutes are developed. The continued use would be based on its
negligible ozone impacts and the energy efficiency advantage of
HCFC-123 chillers over the primary alternative, HFC-134a,
where HCFC-123 results in lower GHG emissions associated
with power generation to run the chillers, as well as lower oper-
ating costs over the 30-year life of the equipment.
At the Science Symposium held in Prague in 2004 and
chaired by Dr. Mario Molina in conjunction with the 16th Meet-
ing of the Parties, it was reported that “HCFC-123 could be
allowed in specific air conditioning applications where its use
promotes superior energy efficiency and assures near-zero
refrigerant emissions.”70
Without the continued use for HCFC-123 until superior
alternatives emerge, the energy efficiency standard for chillers
will decrease, adversely impacting the climate and lowering the
threshold against which future improvements in energy effi-
ciency will be measured. HCFC-123 has a very low ozone-
depletion potential, a lower global warming potential than
HFC-134a, and operates at a low pressure in chillers designed to
minimize leaks. UNEP and others have stated that its continued
use would have a virtually negligible impact on the ozone while
offering superior environmental benefits over alternatives.71
Allowing the continued use of HCFC-123 would create a
precedent only for ODSs that achieve superior environmental
performance over existing alternatives; its continued use could
be structured to encourage continuing innovation for superior
alternatives, perhaps requiring re-application after 2040, or after
better substitutes are identified by the TEAP, assuming existing
use is permitted through product life cycles. At present, HCFC-
123 is the only ODS that meets this environmentally superior cri-
teria. Moreover, any impact on the ozone layer from HCFC-123
could be offset by requiring the destruction of ODSs from banks
on a ODP-weighted basis of 1:1 or greater, which would have the
added benefit of addressing the other cause of the ozone layer’s
delayed recovery: CFC banks expected to be emitted into the
atmosphere over the next decade. It also would provide additional
incentive for further innovation to find superior alternatives, as
would incentive schemes like the Energy Star Program.72
GREATER INCENTIVES FOR DESTRUCTION
OF ODS BANKS
Emissions of CFCs and other ODSs from banks could be
avoided by creating greater incentives for their recovery and
destruction. The Montreal Protocol should provide greater
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incentives for destruction of banks, for example, by allowing
credits to carry forward for more than one year and to transfer
among chemical groups, where the destruction of an amount of
CFCs would allow the production or consumption of an equal
amount, on an ODP-weighted basis, of HCFCs.73 The Montreal
Protocol could provide still greater incentives by linking with the
Kyoto Protocol to provide Certified Emissions Reductions under
the Clean Development Mechanism for the destruction of ODS
banks, given the high GWPs of CFCs. The destruction of banks
would help ensure compliance, since the ODS in banks could
not be reused or recycled after the CFC ban enters into force in
2010 in developing countries.74
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE
The Montreal Protocol should strengthen its compliance
efforts by building on work already underway in the Secretariat,
UNEP OzonAction’s compliance assistance program, and else-
where, to promote an ambitious capacity building program. This
can be accomplished by linking, for example, with the Green
Customs Initiative of UNEP, and the International Network for
Environmental Compliance & Enforcement (INECE). A much
more aggressive effort is warranted by the combined ozone and
climate benefits from strict compliance.
Under Decision XVII/16, the Parties to the Montreal Proto-
col requested a feasibility study for developing systems for mon-
itoring transboundary movements of ODSs. The study proposed
options for monitoring systems that could help reduce illegal
trade in ODSs, which has become a worldwide problem as the
phase-out of CFCs and other ODSs has progressed.75 To combat
illegal trade, the study made a series of recommendations,
including a proposal to set up a global ODS tracking system that
builds on current licensing and reporting systems and includes
cross-checking of licenses and quotas in a centralized manner.76
With regard to the use of ODSs for feedstocks, process
agents, and QPS applications, requiring mandatory periodic
review of current uses and their direct and indirect impacts on
the ozone and climate, utilizing a Life Cycle Analysis, would lay
the groundwork for future action banning the use of ODSs 
where alternatives that are less harmful to the environment are
available.
CONCLUSION
The Montreal Protocol must explicitly assess the environ-
mental impacts, including both ozone and climate impacts, of
ODSs and ODS substitutes, and implement policies that mini-
mize these impacts by favoring ODS substitutes that are the least
harmful to the environment, until superior substitutes emerge.77
The failure to do so will jeopardize the continued success of the
Montreal Protocol in protecting the ozone layer and mitigating
climate change by perpetuating a market that actually works
against the most environmentally-friendly ODS substitutes.
Conversely, the requirement to assess and minimize the environ-
mental impacts of ODSs and their substitutes will create a 
fair market that favors the most environmentally-friendly ODS
substitutes, resolve the perverse incentives problem, and ensure
the continued success of the Montreal Protocol in protecting 
the ozone layer and mitigating climate change. The Montreal
Protocol also must address the significant ODSs stored in banks
that otherwise will be released at end-of-life, and that represent
more than seven times Kyoto’s reductions in terms of climate
emissions.
Ultimately, avoiding the worst impacts of climate change
depends upon the successful evolution of the Kyoto Protocol
(and its successor), including its international emission trading
system, with universal participation and expanded targets after
2012 to reduce GHG emissions enough to avoid dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate, including abrupt
climate change events. Significant progress has been made with
Kyoto’s market-based mechanisms. But Kyoto and the global
carbon market remain works in progress, with the prospect 
of achieving the substantial reductions necessary to avoid “dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference” still many years, if not
decades, away. 
The emissions reductions achieved under the Montreal Pro-
tocol are buying more time to develop a sufficiently strong cli-
mate regime, with a robust and efficient global carbon market,
that efficiently and effectively delivers the needed carbon reduc-
tions. It is impossible to say just how much the planet will warm
before triggering an abrupt climate change event, but critical
thresholds could be as near as ten years away, and it is imperative
to adjust the Montreal Protocol to avoid every ton of CO2-eq.
emissions that it can. In addition to finishing the job of protect-
ing the ozone layer, this is one of the best insurance policies the
world can buy to give us time to succeed with our long-term cli-
mate controls. And it is an insurance policy that we can be confi-
dent will be delivered by the world’s best environmental treaty.
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